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Abstract
Our ability to trust that a random number is truly random is essential for fields as diverse as cryptography
and fundamental tests of quantum mechanics. Device-independent quantum random number generators (QRNGs)
provide a means of completely trusted randomness, but are highly impractical due to their strict technological
requirements, such as loophole-free quantum nonlocality. By making fixed assumptions on specific parts of the
device, semi-device-independent QRNGs lower these requirements drastically. However, this has usually been
done at the cost of limiting their flexibility and security to a specific physical implementation and level of trust.
Here we propose and experimentally test a new framework for semi-device-independent randomness certification
that employs a flexible set of assumptions, allowing it to be applied in a range of physical scenarios involving both
quantum and classical entropy sources. At the heart of our method lies a source of trusted vacuum in the form
of a signal shutter, which enables the honesty of partially trusted measurement devices to be tested and provides
lower bounds on the guessing probability of their measurement outcomes. We experimentally verify our protocol
with a photonic setup and generate secure random bits under three different source assumptions with varying
degrees of security and resulting data rates. Our work demonstrates a simple and practical way for achieving semi-
device-independent randomness generation with user-defined flexibility in terms of levels of trust and physical
implementations.
1 Introduction
Randomness is an important resource in modern information science. It has a great number of applications, ranging
from randomized sampling, simulations, randomized algorithms and above all, cryptography. Many of these appli-
cations critically depend on the quality of random numbers, and therefore the design of high quality random number
generators (RNGs) is of utmost importance. There are many different sources of entropy that can be utilized for
random number generator designs. These range from simple to generate but hard to predict computer data (such as
the movement of a mouse cursor on a computer screen or the time between user keystrokes), to seemingly random
physical phenomena (such as thermal noise or the breakdown in Zener diodes). In this regard, quantum mechanics
offers the possibility of truly random events, such as nuclear decay or photons traveling through a semi-transparent
mirror (see [1] for a review on quantum random number generators).
The quality of random number generators is traditionally assessed with the help of statistical tests, which can
verify that the produced string is virtually indistinguishable from a truly random string. In essence, however, such an
approach to analyzing random number generators is problematic, because the statistical tests do not assume anything
about the origin of the data they test. As an example, take the binary expansion of the number e — although the string
created in this manner would pass many of the conventionally used statistical tests, it is obviously not suitable for
cryptographic purposes. This ignorance of the process used to generate the tested random string opens a window to
various security risks. Aside from malicious attacks on the random number generator, such as inserting back-doors [2]
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or displaying a simple bias towards certain strings [3, 4], its functioning can be compromised by a simple hardware
malfunction, which is often hard to detect [5].
Considerations such as these have recently resulted in a different approach to random number generator designs
based on quantum phenomena, where stronger forms of randomness certificates are possible [6]. Such quantum
random number generators are called device-independent (DI-RNGs) [7–9], because they assume very little about the
hardware they use. The security proof for these devices is usually based on Bell-type arguments: the random number
generator is composed of several non-communicating parts and runs for a set of randomness-generation rounds, which
involve a predetermined quantum measurement. In a small, randomly chosen fraction of the run-time, the device
is tested. In these test rounds, the ability of the devices to violate Bell-type inequalities is verified [10, 11]. The
violation of local-realism can be seen as a certificate that the devices use quantum measurements and their outcomes
are fundamentally unpredictable. Since Bell-type arguments do not assume anything about the devices used apart
from space-like separation, this approach can truly be seen as device-independent. The disadvantage of DI-RNGs
lies in their implementation — loophole-free Bell violations have been achieved only recently and under very strict
laboratory conditions [12–14].
In an attempt to retain the randomness certification capabilities of DI-RNGs with less stringent experimental
requirements, many semi-device-independent random number generators (SDI-RNGs) have been proposed [15–26].
Similar to DI-RNGs, SDI-RNGs include test rounds that are designed to certify the randomness of their output.
However, to make the random number generators experimentally more feasible, reasonable assumptions about the
functioning of some components of the RNG are made, such as a trusted source [15–22] or measurement device
[24, 25].
In this paper we present a new approach to semi-device-independent randomness certification that allows for
flexible assumptions about the workings of an RNG. What sets our work apart from other SDI-RNG proposals is that
our framework is formulated in a high-level abstract language of trusted randomness sources. This allows us to certify
randomness in a large number of practical implementations utilizing both quantum and classical entropy sources.
Additionally, our framework can work with different levels of trust in particular parts of the RNG, without chang-
ing the protocol itself. This is in contrast to existing SDI-RNGs, where the protocol relies on a fixed set of assump-
tions about specific parts of the device. We showcase this flexibility using a photon source and a beam splitter as the
source of entropy. Changing the assumptions on the photon source—whether it produces either single photons, co-
herent/thermal states, or is an unknown source characterized only by its average photon production rate— is possible
in our framework, at the cost of changes in the amount of certifiable entropy. Unlike previous SDI-RNG designs, our
implementation therefore comes with a user-defined security/production rate trade-off.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce our general framework, which consists of three
abstract models of entropy sources, and a general protocol to extract perfect randomness from them. We discuss
methods to lower bound the entropy of strings obtained from our protocol in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to
a particular experiment implementing the described entropy sources with the use of a photon source and a beam-
splitter. Here we also discuss how different assumptions on the experimental setup change its description within
our framework, which results in trade-off between security and randomness production rate. Finally, in section 5 we
experimentally implement the entropy source described in section 4 and post-process its outcomes with three different
sets of assumptions, based on the amount of trust placed on the photon source.
2 General framework
In this section we introduce three different abstract models of randomness, with decreasing level of trust and describe
a protocol, which uses a trusted shutter to extract randomness from such sources.
Our basic assumption about the entropy source is that at regular time intervals, it produces a signal with probability
p, and with probability 1 − p, no signal is produced. Such an assumption on the source is conceptually simple, very
natural, and in fact many conventional entropy sources mentioned above, such as Geiger counters, thermal noise, or
the breakdown in Zener diodes can be modelled in this way. One might argue that such an assumption on the source
is too strong, because if one also assumes perfect and trusted signal detectors, extracting randomness from such a
source is trivial – click events can be interpreted as “1”, and no click events as “0”. Entropy of such an output string
is easily calculable and it can be post-processed into a perfectly random string. Indeed, early trusted commercial
quantum random number generators can be described this way (e.g. IDQuantique [27] using a photon source and a
beam splitter as an entropy source). The main result of this work is that the above assumption on the entropy source
can be made sufficient even in the case of partially untrusted measurement device.
In order to achieve this, we add an additional component to the setup — a movable shutter, which can block the
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signal being sent from the source to the measurement device (see Fig. 1). We call this scenario a simple scenario and
the source of entropy a simple source.
p
A(x)S D
Figure 1: The simple scenario consists of a simple entropy source, S , which emits a random signal with probability p. This
signal is assumed to be unpredictable to any potential adversary. The signal can be blocked with the help of a movable shutter,A, controlled via a binary variable x. The measurement device, D, is assumed to be dishonest.
Taking the simple entropy source introduced above as a building block, we can generalize to a scenario referred to
as a mixed source scenario, where the entropy source is a probabilistic mixture of multiple simple sources. Formally,
we define a discrete (potentially infinite) probability distribution, γ = {γi}, γi ≥ 0∀i, ∑i γi = 1. We associate a simple
source Si with each γi.
In the mixed source scenario, the simple source Si is chosen with probability γi and subsequently a signal is sent
with probability pi (see Fig. 2).
A(x)γγ1
γ2 γn−1
γn
p1 p2 pn−1 pn
. . .
S1 S2 Sn−1 Sn
S
D
Figure 2: In the second scenario, the entropy source S (depicted by a dashed rectangle) is a probabilistic mixture of several
(potentially infinitely many) simple sources S1, . . . ,Sn. A random variable γ is used to choose a simple source Si, which emits
a random signal with probability pi. The choice of source Si in a given round is known to the measurement device D and the
adversary, but not to the user. The random variable γ is constrained either by a fixed probability distribution, or in a more general
scenario by a fixed expected value.
The value of the random variable γ in each round is assumed to be known to the adversary and the measurement
device, but unknown to the user. In order to derive bounds on the entropy produced, the variable γ has to be at
least partially characterized. This characterization takes the form of a (potentially infinite) sequence of constraints,{fj(γ) = cj}. The strongest of such constraint sets is describing γ completely by specifying each γi. We study this
special case separately, however, we show that the entropy of the RNG output can be lower bounded even for weaker
characterizations of γ. In fact, this is possible already if the constraint set contains only a single (smooth) function
(see section 3).
Before we describe our protocol for extracting perfect randomness from the sources described above, we list a
number of required technical assumptions.
• The shutter (A) can be reliably controlled by the user through their inputs x.
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Randomness Extraction Protocol
Data Collection
(1) In each round i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} decide whether the current round is a test round (Qi = TEST) or a
generation round (Qi = GEN) at random with probability (q,1 − q).
(2) If Qi = TEST, choose the shutter setting open/closed (xi = 0/xi = 1)), each with probability (12 , 12).
Then record the setting and the measurement outcome (xi, yi) (yi = 1 if the signal is detected, otherwise
yi = 0).
(3) If Qi =GEN perform the measurement with the shutter open (xi = 0) round and record the measurement
output yi.
Post-Processing
(1) Use the rounds i with Qi = TEST to estimate test statistics S, (see (2.1)).
(2) Estimate the min-entropy Hmin(Y ∣E) of the random variable Y = {yi∣Qi = GEN}, (see section 3).
(3) Choose a security parameter ε and use a universal hash function on Y to obtain a stringZ, (see section 5).
Protocol 1: An outline of our randomness extraction protocol. For post-processing, note that the estimation depends on the
assumptions made on the entropy source used. The output of the protocol Z (of length Hmin(Y ∣E)), is a random variable whose
distribution deviates at most ε in variational distance from a uniform random variable.
• The user has access to a uniform random seed X uncorrelated to the devices. For example, this can be a private
randomness source or public randomness beacon [28].
• The entropy source (S) is a passive element which does not change from round to round.
• The measurement device (D) is memoryless, which together with the previous assumption implies that each
round is identical and independently distributed.
• In case of quantum entropy sources (S) in which the signal state is in a superposition with no-signal state, the
measurement device (D) is described by a projector onto a basis that contains the no-signal state (see section 4
for an example with coherent photon sources).
• There is no communication between the devices besides the signal channel, and the laboratory is shielded from
external eavesdroppers. In particular, neither the measurement device nor the source receive direct information
about the shutter settings x.
As in any cryptographic protocol, if any of these assumptions cannot be met, the security of the final string cannot
be guaranteed. The assumptions imply that the measurement device is left mostly uncharacterized, in particular, it
may still be classically correlated with an adversary.
Now we are ready to present the protocol, which consists of two parts: data collection and post-processing. For
practical purposes, the protocol is run in large batches of N rounds. For the full description, see the box, Protocol 1.
As is seen from the protocol, the user will use the testing rounds to obtain a statistical estimation of the workings of
the device.
S = (P (click∣x = 0), P (click∣x = 1)) = (α,β) (2.1)
More precisely, the user will create a vector Sˆ as an estimate for S in Eq. (2.1), which will be filled out with observed
experimental frequencies. This introduces an estimation error εe, which can be made arbitrarily small by increasing
the number of rounds in a batch N , and the testing rate q. To keep the main text easier to read, we assume that the
experimentalist has access to the actual probabilities in Eq. (2.1), and elaborate on the sampling error in appendix E.
In the following section we describe the post-processing procedure. The goal is to estimate min-entropyHmin(Y ∣E)
of the output string Y conditioned on the knowledge of the adversary E. Min-entropy Hmin(Y ∣E) roughly describes
the length of a perfectly random string obtainable from Y with the help of randomness extractors [29]. The lower
bound on min-entropy is obtained by lower bounding the probability of the adversary to guess the outcome of a single
randomness generating round (shutter open), denoted g∗. The obtained lower bound on depends on g∗ the type of the
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entropy source used — simple or mixed, with or without the full characterization of γ. Finally, guessing probability,
is related to min-entropy of the outcome Y as
Hmin(Y ∣E) ≥ −∣Y ∣ log2(g∗), (2.2)
where ∣Y ∣ is the number of randomness generating rounds.
3 Entropy estimation
In this section we give a procedure to estimate the entropy of the data collected in the protocol described in the
previous section. This is split into three parts based on the type of entropy source used.
3.1 Simple source entropy estimation.
The simplest case uses a simple entropy source S which sends a signal with probability p. Based on the assumptions
introduced earlier, the strategy of the measurement device to click (i.e. behave as if it detected the signal) in a given
round can be based only on whether the signal arrived or not. There are only four possible deterministic measurement
device strategies: “Never Click” (SN ), “Always Click” (SY ), “Click Honestly” (SH ), “Click Dishonestly” (S¬H ). We
represent these strategies by the observable behaviours of the measurement device, which can be expressed as vectors(P (click∣x = 0), P (click∣x = 1)):
SN = (0,0)
SY = (1,1)
SH = (p,0)
S¬H = (1 − p,1)
(3.1)
General non-deterministic strategies can be expressed as convex combinations of these four deterministic strate-
gies, with a hidden variable λ that is shared between the measurement device and the adversary. We assume that
the values (Y,N,H or ¬H) of the hidden variable λ are identically distributed throughout the rounds according to a
probability distribution λY , λN , λH , λ¬H ≥ 0;λY + λN + λH + λ¬H = 1. The adversary tries to guess whether the
measurement device clicked or not in each given round based on their knowledge of λ, and thus to guess the outcomes
of the RNG.
Let us highlight the importance of the trusted movable shutter in our design. If the design did not contain it, then
setting the random variable λ to be uniformly distributed over the strategies SN and SY would lead to the output of the
RNG being uniformly random as well. It would therefore pass any statistical test with high probability, even though
the adversary would posses its perfect copy, rendering it useless for any cryptographic purpose.
In order to safely bound the amount of the entropy produced, the user must assume that any deviation from the
idealized honest scenario SH is correlated with information gained by the adversary. We measure the information
gain by the adversary’s optimal guessing probability, g∗, which is related to the min-entropy via g∗ = 2−Hmin(Y ∣E). If
in a given round the measurement device is following the strategies SN or SY , then the adversary can be certain of
the output, but if SH or S¬H is used, the guessing probability is reduced to g ∶= max(1 − p, p).
Without loss of generality, let us assume that P (click∣x = 0) > P (click∣x = 1) (the other case can be treated
similarly, due to the symmetry of the measurement device strategies). Then, Se = (α,β) can be written as the convex
combination 12(2β,2β) + 12(2α − 2β,0). Note that the (2β,2β) part can be obtained by the measurement device
by using only the strategies SN or SY , i.e. without decreasing the adversary’s guessing probability. On the other
hand, the (2α − 2β,0) part can be obtained by using strategy SH only. In particular, this means that whenever our
assumption holds, the adversary’s optimal strategy is to set λ¬H = 0, and their guessing probability can be obtained
by solving the following optimization problem:
g∗ = max{λ} λN + λY + λH ⋅ g (3.2)
s.t. λY + λH ⋅ p = α
λY = β
λN + λY + λH = 1
λN,Y,H ≥ 0
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Since the first three constraints contain only three variables and take the form of equalities, we can directly solve them
for λ{N,Y,H} to obtain:
λY = β, λH = α − β
p
, λN = 1 − β − α − β
p
.
In order to satisfy the last constraint, λN,Y,H ≥ 0, the following needs to hold:
0 ≤ β ≤ 1 β ≤ α ≤ β + p α ≤ p + β(1 − p) ≤ α + p.
These six conditions are not independent, but they can be reduced to three conditions which are required for the
existence of the solution (see appendix A for a geometric interpretation):
0 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ p + β(1 − p). (3.3)
If these conditions are satisfied, the result of the optimization is
g∗ = 1 − (α − β) (1 − g
p
) , (3.4)
and Hmin(Y ∣E) ≥ − log2 [1 − (α − β) (1−gp )] ∣Y ∣, where ∣Y ∣ is the size of the output string Y .
3.2 Mixed source entropy estimation
Let us now turn to the more involved case of a probabilistic mixture of countably many simple sources. Recall that in
this case the source S is a mixture of simple sources Si, characterized by a known probability distribution γ. Since
the measurement device knows which source Si is being used in a given round, it can produce different statistics Si
for each source, and the overall observed statistics can be written as S = ∑i γiSi. Just like in the case of a single
simple source, without loss of generality we assume that S = (α,β) satisfies α ≥ β. This assumption also implies
(see appendix B) that in the optimal solution each Si = (αi, βi) satisfies αi ≥ βi, as well as the full set of conditions
in Eq. (3.3). Thus, for each source Si the produced statistics can be written as Si = λi,Y SY +λi,NSN +λi,HSHi , with
SY = (1,1), SN = (0,0) being the constant strategies and SHi = (pi,0) the honest strategy of the source Si. Since
each source Si produces entropy according to gi ∶= max(pi,1−pi) and contributes to the overall guessing probability
g∗ by g∗i = λi,Y + λi,N + λi,H ⋅ gi weighted by γi, we have:
g∗ =∑
i
γig
∗
i . (3.5)
Hence, the bound to the adversary’s guessing probability is given by the solution to the following linear program:
max{λ} ∑i γi(λi,N + λi,Y + λi,H ⋅ gi)
s.t. ∑
i
γi (λi,Y + λi,H ⋅ pi) = α
∑
i
γi ⋅ λi,Y = β
λi,N + λi,Y + λi,H = 1 ∀i
λi,{N,Y,H} ≥ 0.
(3.6)
In order to formulate the solution to this optimization problem, let us introduce some notation. We start by dividing
the set of all entropy sources S into two sets, S+ and S−. The source Si belongs to S+ if and only if pi > 12 , otherwise
it belongs to S−. Let us also define N+ as the number of sources in the set S+ (including the possibility that N+
represents ∞). We will use positive integers i ≥ 1 to label the elements of S+, and negative integers i ≤ −1 to label the
elements of S−. This allows us to define N− = −∣S−∣, where ∣S−∣ is the cardinality of S− (again, potentially infinite).
Then, without loss of generality, we will use the ordering of the sources in the set S such that ∀i > j, pi ≥ pj . We use
the convention that unless specified otherwise, ∑i denotes the sum over all sources from S . Last but not least, note
that we deliberately left out the index i = 0, as it is used in a formulation of the solution and its proof.
Using the above notation, the solution of the optimisation problem (3.6) reads (see appendix B for proof):
g∗ = 1 − (α − β) (1 − pN
pN
) + N+∑
i=N+1γi ( pipN − 1) . (3.7)
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Here, if ∑i∈S+ γipi ≤ α − β, then N = 0 and pN = 12 , and otherwise N is defined to be the largest natural number such
that
N+∑
i=N γipi ≥ α − β. (3.8)
Again, the guessing probability g∗ allows us to lower bound the min-entropy of the output string Y of length ∣Y ∣ as
Hmin(Y ∣E) ≥ −∣Y ∣ log2(g∗).
3.3 Mixed source with partial information
In the more general case, the probability distribution γ, which chooses the simple source Si to use in a given round,
is not fully characterized, but is constrained by a set of functions, {fj(γ) = cj}. Formally, all the arguments from
the previous case remain the same, except now the optimization needs to be done over the parameters γi as well. The
maximization task can be stated as follows.
max{λ},{γ} ∑i γi (λi,N + λi,Y + λi,H ⋅ gi)
s.t. fj(γ) = cj ∀j∑
i
γi = 1
∑
i
γi (λi,Y + λi,H ⋅ pi) = α
∑
i
γi (λi,Y + λi,H) = β
λi,N + λi,Y + λi,H = 1 ∀i
λi,{N,Y,H} ≥ 0
γi ≥ 0.
(3.9)
Since the functions fj are in principle arbitrary, the constraints might not be linear anymore and thus it might not be
possible to efficiently solve the problem, even numerically. However, if the functions fj are smooth, for every fixed
distribution γ, we are able to optimize over the variables {λ} according to the previous section. Therefore we can use
the solution in Eq. (3.7) as the objective function, and the optimization problem becomes:
max{γ} 1 − (α − β) (1 − pNpN ) + N+∑i=N+1γi ( pipN − 1) ,
s.t. fj(γ) = cj ∀j∑
i
γi = 1
γi ≥ 0.
(3.10)
Note that this is still not an easy optimization problem, because even if the functions fj are smooth, a minor change
in the distribution of γi might lead to a change in the starting point of the summation in Eq. (3.8), as N is implicitly
dependent on γi via Eq. (3.8).
To address this problem, let us change the perspective on N . Instead of N being an implicitly defined value
dependent on γ, we will interpret it as a free parameter. Additionally, it can be shown (see Appendix B) that the
maximum is obtained when the condition in Eq. (3.8) for γ is satisfied with equality. In such a case the objective
function can be written in a simpler form (see Eq. (B.36)) and the optimization problem becomes:
max{γ} 1 − (α − β) + N
+∑
i=N γi(2pi − 1),
s.t. fj(γ) = cj ∀j∑
i
γi = 1
γi ≥ 0
N+∑
i=N γipi = (α − β).
(3.11)
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Note that if we fix the value of N , this maximization problem becomes much easier, because the target function is
linear in γ. This yields a simple algorithm to find the solution of (3.11). One can simply solve the problem for each
possible N ∈ {1, . . . ,N+}, and take the overall maximum over the solutions as the final outcome.
This algorithm of course involves a potentially infinite number of optimization problems to solve, but for simple
(e.g. linear) constraint functions fj it can be shown that there is a threshold value Nmax, such that it is not possible to
satisfy both the conditions given by fj and ∑N+i=N γipi = (α − β), whenever N > Nmax. Last but not least, note that
if the functions fj are linear, for each fixed value of N the optimization problem (3.11) is a linear program and thus
can be solved efficiently. Additionally, in appendix C we show that in case of a single linear constraint function f ,
feasible values ofN are constrained to a small finite interval, which renders the optimization efficient. The solution to
this optimization problem again yields the probability g∗ of the adversary to guess the outcome of a single generating
round, which is related to min-entropy of output string Y as H(Y ∣E) ≥ −∣Y ∣ log2(g∗).
4 Example: A photon through a beam-splitter
In this section we describe a simple optical setup for randomness generation and analyze it with the help of our
framework. The entropy source S consists of a photon source PS emitting photons through a beam-splitter BS with
reflection probability pi. Transmitted photons are coupled to a photon detector D and their path can be blocked by
a movable shutter A, which can be reliably controlled via a binary variable x. Reflected photons are discarded (see
Fig. 3). We use this physical setup to showcase the assumption flexibility our framework allows for. First of all, the
model that describes the entropy source in this setup depends on the assumption we place on the photon source PS .
A(x)
PS BS
S D
Figure 3: The photonic entropy source S (depicted by a dashed rectangle) consists of a photon source PS coupled to a beam-
splitter BS with the probability of reflection pi and the probability of transmission 1 − pi. Transmitted photons are interpreted
as a random signal emitted from the entropy source, while the reflected photons are discarded. In order to extract randomness
from such a source, we use a mostly uncharacterized and untrusted measurement device and a trusted shutter controlled by a
binary variable x. According to the assumptions we place on the photon source PS , this photonic setup is able to realize all three
different general scenarios that we introduced in section 2.
Single photon. If the photon source PS produces a single photon on demand, the entropy source S is a simple
entropy source with the probability p = 1 − pi of sending a signal.
Known photon distribution. If the photon source PS produces i photons with known probability γi, the source S
is a mixture of simple sources Si with pi = 1 − pii and mixing probability γ = {γi}.
Known mean number of photons. If the photon source is characterized only by the mean photon number µ, the
setup corresponds to a source S which is a mixture of simple sources Si with pi = 1 − pii and the mixing
probability γ is constrained by ∑i iγi = µ.
While the single photon source case can be easily seen to be a simple source, the other two cases require further ex-
planation. Assume that the source produces an n-photon event, where n ≥ 2. Since the number of photons transmitted
through the beam-splitter can vary between 0 and n, the information available to the (photon-counting) measurement
device is more complex than just binary information about receiving the signal or not. The response function of the
measurement device is therefore potentially more complex than the four deterministic functions described in Eq. (3.1).
In fact, there are 2n+1 different deterministic response functions assigning click/no-click measurement device events
to the number of transmitted photons. In appendix D we show that in spite of this exponential increase, for each
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n there are only four response functions that yield the optimal guessing probability for the adversary. The first two
are “Never Click” and “Always Click”, which are fully deterministic and do not depend on the number of received
photons. The third response function is labeled “Click Honestly”. Using this response function, the measurement
device clicks when a positive number of photons arrive and does not click when no photons arrive. The last response
function is called “Click Dishonestly”, and the measurement device clicks only when no photons arrive. These are
exactly the four strategies that characterize a simple entropy source, since the measurement device decides only on
the binary information whether it received a signal (i.e. non-zero number of photons) or not. Therefore, the second
case can be characterized as a mixed source with known mixing probability γ and the third case as a mixed source
with mixing probability constrained by mean photon number µ.
Note that in the setup described above we do not assume anything about the coherence of the photon source PS .
In fact, in order to be able to describe the strategies available to the measurement device as in the above paragraph, the
setup needs to fulfill one out of two assumptions. Either PS produces states which are diagonal in the Fock basis (e.g.
thermal states), or the measurement device is measuring in the Fock basis. In both cases, the mapping to the abstract
mixed entropy sources is straightforward. Assuming that the state is diagonal in the Fock basis implies that the whole
setup can be implemented with the use of classical sources of light. On the other hand, the Fock basis measurement
assumption is very well motivated from the practical point of view and it allows us some leeway in the description of
the PS . Namely, we do not require the source to produce a specific photonic state; it can be characterized solely by a
probability distribution γ or its mean.
Now we are ready to formulate the lower bounds on the guessing probability g∗ of a single generating round in
case of the known photon distribution and known mean number of photons, which can be related to min-entropy of
the output string Y of the RNG protocol as Hmin(Y ∣E) ≥ −∣Y ∣ log2(g∗).
4.1 Known distribution
According to the solution of the general case in Eq. (3.7), if ∑∞i=1 γi(1 − pii) > α − β, we need to find N , that is, the
largest natural number such that ∑∞i=N γi(1 − pii) ≥ α − β. In this case, the optimal guessing probability is
g∗ = 1 − (α − β)( piN
1 − piN ) + ∞∑i=N+1γi ( 1 − pi
i
1 − piN − 1) . (4.1)
Otherwise, if ∑∞i=1 γi(1 − pii) ≤ α − β, the optimal guessing probability is
g∗ = 1 − (α − β) + ∞∑
i=1γi(1 − 2pii). (4.2)
4.2 Mean number of photons
In this section we assume that the photon source is characterized only by its mean photon number µ. This assumption
requires us to solve an optimization problem of the form (3.11), where now the condition f(γ) = cγ reads
∞∑
i=0 iγi = µ, (4.3)
and pi = 1 − pii.
In appendix C we show that the solution to this optimization problem contains only three non-zero probabilities γi:
γ0 = 1 − γN − γN+1 (4.4)
γN+1 = µ − γNN
N + 1 (4.5)
γN = (N + 1)(α − β) − (1 − piN+1)µ(N + 1)(1 − piN) − (1 − piN+1)N . (4.6)
for each feasible value ofN = i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,N+}. After plugging these values of γ0, γN , γN+1 into the target function,
we obtain the optimal guessing probability:
g∗N = 1 + (α − β) − (α − β) + µ(piN+1 − piN)(N + 1)(1 − piN) −N(1 − piN+1) . (4.7)
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The overall solution of (3.11) is maxN{g∗N} where the the maximization is done over all feasible values of N . In
appendix C we show that in general there is only a finite number of feasible values N , and therefore the maximum
always exists. Although the number of these values can still be prohibitively large, in the analysis of the data obtained
from the experiment we conducted (see section 5), only a single feasible value of N was encountered, making the
analysis very efficient.
4.3 Other possible assumptions on the photonic setup
In order to emphasise the flexibility of our framework, in this subsection we discuss possible modifications of the
optical setup described above. Notice that two probability distributions are characterized in the above setup. The first
one is the photon number probability distribution γ and the second one is the beam-splitter reflection probability pi,
or, more generally, binary distributions with probability of success 1 − pii associated with each photon number. The
difference between them is that in our setup, the randomness resulting from the beam-splitter events is assumed to be
private, unlike γ, which is available to the adversary. Essentially, our framework can be seen as a procedure to certify
randomness originating from the trusted source (in this case the beam-splitter) in a noisy setup, where the noise is
only partially characterized.
One can, however, assume that the photon emission is also a private random event characterized by γ. This is
natural if the photon source PS is coherent for example, since in this case it is impossible for the adversary to know
the photon number in a given round before the measurement. In such a case, both the entropy originating from the
beam-splitter and the entropy of the photon source can be combined into a simple source with the probability of signal
p = 1 −∑∞i=1 γi(1 − pii). Or, even more interestingly, the beam-splitter can be left out from the setup altogether and
assuming Fock measurements, the setup can be analyzed as a simple source with signal probability 1 − γ0. Note that
a similar experiment was studied in two recent works [20, 30], but was analyzed by different techniques.
5 Experiment and data analysis
Figure 4: Experimental implementation: The proposed protocols are tested in an optical setup where weak coherent pulses of
8 ns duration at 5 MHz are generated by driving a laser diode with a signal generator (Pulse Streamer), and attenuating its power
to ∼ 1 photon per pulse. The photons (represented by the solid red line) are incident on a fiber beam-splitter (BS) that discards the
reflected photons. The transmitted photons are fast-switched via a fiber electro-optic intensity modulator (EOM) that is driven
by the digital output of the pulse streamer. The pulses at the output of the shutter (composed of the BS and EOM) are sent to a
superconducting nanowire single photon detector (SNSPD). The counts of the detector and a clock signal from the pulse streamer
are recorded with a counting logic (quTAG time-tagger), which allows one to extract coincidences for each pulse and generate
the bit string.
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In this section we implement the optical random number generation setup described in section 4. In the experi-
mental implementation (see Fig. 4), the photon source PS is a source of weak coherent pulses, the shutter A(x) is
implemented with an electro-optic modulator (EOM), and the detection D is performed by a single-photon detector
(SNSPD) and a counting logic (time tagger) to extract the output bit string. In real world network applications, clock
synchronisation of optical pulse trains and detectors would be straightforward. However, for the purposes of this
demonstration, all electrical signals are generated by a Swabian instruments Pulse-Streamer 8/2. We drive a laser
diode with 0.8 V analogue pulses of 8 ns duration (limited by analogue output bandwidth) at 5 MHz (limited by
single-photon detection amplifier deadtime ∼ 150 ns), attenuate the weak coherent pulses to ∼ 1 photon per pulse,
and are then incident through a fiber beam-splitter with power transmission 0.5118 ± 0.0005. These pulses are fast-
switched via a fiber lithium niobite electro-optic intensity modulator driven by a digital output of the signal generator,
which with probability q = 8/100 blocks the channel (i.e. TEST rounds with x = 1). A typical extinction ratio of
1/100 is observed and a slight thermal drift is calibrated for each 100,000 rounds of the experiment. The pulses are
then routed to the detectors through a channel with lumped efficiency from switch to detectors of 0.9339 ± 0.00005.
Detection is made by superconducting nanowire single photon detectors with efficiency 0.9231 ± 0.0007. A QuTools
QuTAG counting logic records time-tags from the detectors along with a clock signal from the signal generator, al-
lowing coincidences for each pulse to be extracted using a 10 ns coincidence window, and the output bit string to be
recovered.
Once the data is collected, we begin the post-processing on batches of size N = 100,000. With probability 8/92
we randomly select some of the non-blocked rounds to be TEST rounds with x = 0 (such that the expected number
of test rounds with x = 0 is the same as the expected number of test rounds with x = 1). Given the large number of
total test rounds (∼ 16,000), we use the Chernoff–Hoeffding bound to calculate the test statistic Sˆ (2.1) with sampling
error ε = 10−6. In particular, we give a conservative estimate of S and the probability that either α or β falls outside
of the desired interval is 2ε (see appendix E for details). For each batch, we used Sˆ to calculate an upper bound on
the adversary’s guessing probability g∗. We have performed separate estimations for the three scenarios; (i) a single
photon source, (ii) the photon number distributed according to a Poisson probability distribution with mean µ, (iii)
the photon number being µ on average. For cases (ii) and (iii), we used µ = 1.06 since it is an upper bound on the
observed average photon number per pulse, and that yields the least amount of entropy.
For simplicity, the length of the output string Y was chopped to a constant size of ∣Y ∣ = 83,000 per batch, which
leads to a final lower bound on the entropy of the string Y , expressed as Hmin(Y ∣E) ≥ −83,000 ⋅ log2(g∗). To extract
the final random string Z from Y (see the protocol description in Fig. 3), a hashing function, in our case a random
binary Toeplitz matrix, has been applied to Y . To keep the discussion clear, we shall focus on case (ii) of a known
(Poisson) distribution. The remaining cases follow an analogous post-processing strategy. In order to reduce the
amount of randomness needed, we only generated one Toeplitz matrix and re-used it for every batch. Indeed, the
Leftover Hashing Lemma guarantees that when using a Toeplitz matrix of dimensions ∣Y ∣ × (− log2(g∗) + 2 log δ),
the output string Z is at most δ-far in `1-distance from being uniformly distributed [31]. We take δ = 2−100 ≈ 10−31,
which implies that we can re-use the Toeplitz matrix ∼ 1020 times and still maintain a `1-distance from the uniform
distribution of no more than 10−10.
Note that the estimates for different batches of data differ. However, in order to re-apply the same hash function
to each batch, it is important to guarantee that all batches have at least the same amount of min-entropy. If all batches
were used, the total min-entropy would be bounded by the min-entropy of the worst batch which can be rather low.
Therefore it is advantageous to discard a (small) number of batches with low certified min-entropy, which increases
the amount of min-entropy per batch, but decreases the number of batches. The experimental distribution of estimated
min-entropies (per bit) can be seen in Fig. 5. One can optimize the cutoff threshold min-entropy for each case in order
to extract the maximum amount of randomness.
In the known photon-number distribution scenario (ii), we chose a cutoff of 0.167 bits of entropy per physical bit,
i.e. any batch whose estimated min-entropy was lower was simply discarded. Therefore, the Toeplitz matrix generated
was of size 83,000 × 13,661. For demonstration purposes, we collected data from 1,000 batches with each batch on
average having an estimated 0.185 bits of entropy per physical bit. 97.5% of the batches were calculated to be above
the set threshold, resulting in a total of 13.2 Mbits of extracted randomness. The results for the other cases can be
found in Table 1.
Finally, we carried out the industry-standard NIST randomness tests using an improved implementation presented
in [32]. As expected, the processed output performed well in all of these tests.
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# Assumptions Cutoff Hmin Batches Used Extracted Randomness
(i) Single photon source
pn ∼ δ1,n 0.458 985 37.2 Mbits
(ii) Poisson photon number distribution
pn ∼ Pois(µ) 0.167 975 13.2 Mbits
(iii) Unknown distribution, mean constraint
E[n] = µ 0.043 948 3.19 Mbits
Table 1: Amount of experimental randomness extracted from different scenarios. In our experiment we have used µ = 1.06.
The same raw data (1,000 batches consisting of 100,000 rounds each) was used in each case. For comparison, a hypothetically
ideal experiment, with beam splitter transmittance p = 1/2, single photon source PS , and perfect observed statistics S = (1/2,0),
would produce 69.5 Mbits from the same data. This takes into account that the data still has to be tested, and the estimator Sˆ is
always taken in a conservative way.
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Figure 5: Distribution of min-entropy estimates depending on the assumptions on the photon source used for 1,000 experimental
batches. From left to right, the assumptions are: (iii) mean photon number µ = 1.06, (ii) Poisson probability distribution with
µ = 1.06, and (i) single photon source.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a novel framework to design and analyze semi-device-independent random number
generators. In contrast with previous approaches, our framework does not require any fixed assumptions to be made
on the workings of an RNG, can be applied in a very broad family of physical implementations, and can cover very
different levels of trust placed on different parts of the random number generator. The centerpiece of our approach
consists of a shutter that can trustfully block the transmitted signal. This, in connection with some limited trust in the
source and/or measurement devices, proves to be enough to certify randomness.
During the certification protocol, sample data is collected in order to characterize the behaviour of the measure-
ment devices during both shutter settings (open or closed). This sample data is subsequently used to calculate the
probability that the adversary, who is classically correlated with the measurement devices, is able to guess the out-
come of the measurements with open shutter. This calculation involves solving a number of optimization problems
expressed as linear programs. The exact formulation and number of these linear programs depends on the level of
trust we place into the entropy source. Three different trust levels are possible: (i) a simple source emits a signal with
probability p; or the entropy source is a mixture of multiple such simple sources governed by a probability distribution
γ, which is either (ii) fully characterized; or (iii) partially characterized. The main benefit of our framework is that
all three characterizations can be used with the same physical setup and can be seen as different levels of trust placed
onto the entropy source.
We showcase the applicability of the framework by implementing a random number generator using a weak
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coherent optical source and a beam-splitter. This implementation allowed us to demonstrate the novel property of
our framework: flexibility in the assumptions made about specific parts of the device. We have data analyzed from a
single experiment under three very different sets of assumptions on the source — true single photons, coherent states,
and an unknown source characterized only by its average photon production rate. In all cases, we were able to extract
high-quality random strings, but with significantly different rates. This is natural, as stronger assumptions on the
source allow for better extraction rates at the cost of giving the adversary more possibilities to attack.
Our approach provides significant practical benefits for secure randomness generation. Using the same simple
device, a user can make their own choice of the level of secrecy or production rate, just by choosing the appropriate
post-processing strategy. Very interestingly, our results show that even for the most adversarial assumption on the
source, i.e. trust only in the mean number of photons, rates of the same order of magnitude were achieved as with
the rather strong assumption of a coherent source. The average number of photons produced by a source is testable
in principle via its energy consumption, which provides a possible means to further strengthen the security of our
framework. Our results pave the way towards practical and experimentally feasible semi-device-independent random
number generators, which play a crucial role in the ongoing quantum information revolution.
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A Geometric interpretation of the optimization problems
In this appendix we present a geometric interpretation of the problems of finding g∗ for both a simple source and a
mixed source with fixed γ. The geometric interpretation is helpful to build an intuition which in turn helps under-
standing the formal solutions in the following appendices. Let us start with a simple source S with probability p of
emitting a random signal. Recall that the problem can be phrased as the following linear program:
g∗ = max{λ} λN + λY + λH ⋅ g
s.t. S = λNSN + λY SY + λHSH
λN + λY + λH = 1
λN,Y,H ≥ 0,
where g = max (p,1 − p) is the probability to guess the outcome of the source, and S = (P (click∣x = 0), P (click∣x = 1))
is the description of the device behaviour estimated during the run of the protocol. Likewise,
SN = (0,0)
SY = (1,1)
SH = (p,0)
S¬H = (1 − p,1),
are the possible deterministic behaviours of the measurement device. As we have shown in the main text, conditioned
on
0 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ p + β(1 − p),
the solution to this problem is
g∗ = 1 − (α − β) (1 − g
p
) . (A.1)
In fact, this has a simple geometric interpretation shown in Fig. 6.
All possible observed statistics are convex combinations of the points SN , SY , SH and S¬H (inside the blue
polytope in Fig. 6). Note that the deterministic strategies SN and SY allow the measurement devices to obtain only
the observed probabilities lying on the line α = β (red diagonal line in Fig. 6). The strategies represented by these
points have guessing probability 1. On the other hand, the point (p,0) represents the honest strategy SH , which
has guessing probability g = max(p,1 − p). It follows that the observed points with the same distance (α−β)√
2
from
the diagonal line α = β (depicted as the gray line in Fig. 6) have the same guessing probability, as they are convex
combinations of strategies on the diagonal and the honest strategy, with the same weight on the strategies on the
diagonal. Additionally, the smallest guessing probability (and thus the highest certified entropy) is obtained for the
point SH , which is the point farthest from the α = β line. A crucial fact, that is important to understand how the
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Figure 6: Since observed probabilities S = (α,β) are mixtures of deterministic strategies, the space of possible values of S can
be depicted as the blue polytope. With the assumption that α ≥ β, i.e. the measurement devices click more often when the shutterA(x) is open, we can restrict the adversary to use of three strategies SY , SN , SH only. In such a case, the decomposition of the
observed probabilities S = (α,β) into deterministic strategies is unique.
optimal solution in the case of mixed entropy sources looks like, is that when p ≤ 12 , the optimal guessing probability
g∗ in Eq. (A.1) does not depend on p at all, as in this case g = 1 − p. Then we have g∗ = 1 − (α − β), that is, the
optimal guessing probability decreases with a rate proportional to the distance from the diagonal. In other words, an
observed point (α,β) certifies the same amount of entropy for all simple sources with p ≤ 12 . On the other hand, if
p > 12 , the rate at which the guessing probability decreases with the distance from the α = β line depends on p as(1−p)
p , which is a decreasing function of p. That is, an observed point (α,β) certifies more entropy for sources with a
smaller parameter p. Additionally, it is important to note that the conditions for the solution 0 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ p + β(1 − p)
correspond to (α,β) being in the blue polytope, below the α = β line (that is, the observed statistics is feasible and
β ≤ α).
The geometric interpretation of a mixed source is slightly more involved. Feasible observed points S = (α,β) =∑i γiSi are mixtures (according to a probability distribution γ) of feasible points Si of sources Si. The feasibility of
Si means that it is constrained into its corresponding polytope defined by the strategies S¬Hi and SHi (see Fig. 7 for
an example with a mixture of four simple sources). This implies that all feasible points (α,β) are constrained into a
polytope defined by the deterministic strategies SN , SY and the weighted averages of the non-deterministic strategies∑i γiSHi = (∑i γipi,0) and ∑i γi¬SHi = (1 −∑i γipi,1) (the cyan polytope on the left subfigure of Fig. 7)
Every non-extremal point of the feasible polytope can be decomposed into convex combinations of statistics of
the simple sources, Si, in infinitely many ways. Let us now argue, that the decompositions which lead to the highest
guessing entropy (and therefore are optimal), have a specific form. There are essentially three different cases.
Let us first deal with the easiest case, in which all the simple sources in the mixture belong to S−, i.e. pi ≤ 12
for all i. As we have discussed above, in such a case the contribution of each simple source Si to the total guessing
probability depends only on the distance of Si from the diagonal, and not on the value of pi. Note that for any linear
decomposition of (α,β) into Si with weights γi, the weighted distance of the points Si from the diagonal is equal to
α−β√
2
. Therefore, each decomposition leads to the same guessing probability 1 − (α − β).
Whenever the mixed source contains also sources with pi > 12 (i.e. S+ is non-empty), the problem becomes more
interesting. Again, the weighted distance of all the points Si ∈ S from the diagonal is constant, however, the guessing
probability contribution of the sources in S+ depends both on the distance from the diagonal and their parameter pi –
the larger the parameter pi, the smaller the contribution per distance from the diagonal. This simple observation can be
used to describe the optimal decomposition of (α,β) into the points Si. Sources in S+, starting from the source with
the highest pi, must contribute to the distance of (α,β) from the diagonal as much as possible. Therefore, starting
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Figure 7: Here we provide an example with a mixed source S being a mixture of four sources S−1, S−2, S1, S2, with γ−2 = γ−1 =
γ1 = γ2 = 14 . Note that simple sources with pi ≤ 12 have negative index and belong to S− and sources with pi > 12 have positive
index and belong to S+. In the left figure we depict a (cyan) polytope to which all possible observed points S are constrained. It
can be seen as a weighted average of the polytopes constraining each simple source in the mixture. In the middle figure we show
a feasible (sub-optimal) solution of the optimization problem to maximize the adversary’s guessing probability. The observed
point S = (α,β) is a weighted mixture of the points S−2, S−1, S1, S2, which are constrained into their corresponding polytopes
defined by the strategies S¬Hi and SHi . In the right figure we show an optimal solution with S−1 and S−2 on the zero-entropy
diagonal (i.e. λ−2,H = λ−1,H = 0), S2 = SH2 (i.e. λ2,H = 1) and S1 an intermediate point. Note that only S1 and S2 contribute to
the distance of (α,β) from the diagonal.
from the source Si with the highest pi and working downwards, we want to set as many Si = SHi as possible. This
situation splits into two more cases. In the first one, we run out of sources in S+ before reaching the desired distance.
This means that ∀Si ∈ S+, we have Si = SHi , and the rest of the distance needs to be covered by sources in S−. This
can be done arbitrarily, as we have argued before. In the last case, the distance from the diagonal can be reached withSi ∈ S+ only. This leads to a situation where for the k < ∣S+∣ sources with the highest pi we have that Si = SHi , the
point of the source with the (k + 1)-st largest value of pi in S+ has a non-zero distance from the diagonal, and the
rest of the points (of both S+ and S−) lie on the diagonal. An example of the last case is depicted in the rightmost
subfigure of Fig. 7. Note that while this argument helps to build an intuition, in order to fully solve the problem one
must calculate the exact contributions of Si ∈ S+ to the distance of (α,β) from the diagonal (and thus the guessing
entropy contributions) for an arbitrary feasible point of an arbitrary mixed source S, in all three possible cases. This
is formally done in appendix B.
B Known distribution analysis
Before solving the optimization problem (B.1), we discuss that α ≥ β implies that the optimal solution fulfills αi ≥ βi,
for all partial solutions Si associated with Si. This fact in turn implies that in the formulation of the optimization
problem we can disregard strategies λi,¬H .
We prove the above by contradiction: assume that α ≥ β, but in the optimal solution some of the boxes S↑ ⊂ S have∀Sj ∈ S↑, Sj = (αj , βj), βj > αj . Let us define S↓ = S/S↑. Then denote S↑ = (α↑, β↑) = 1∑i∈S↑ γi ∑j∈S↑ γjSj and S↓ =(α↓, β↓) = 1∑i∈S/S↓ γi ∑j∈S↓ γjSj . The observed statistics can be now written as S = (α,β) = ∑i∈S↑ γiS↑ +∑i∈S↓ γiS↓.
Geometrically (see appendix A) this means that the point S lies between S↑ and S↓. This allows us to construct a
new solution, in which both S↑ and S↓ are moved proportionally to γ in the direction towards S. This decreases
both α↓ − β↓ and β↑ − α↑. Since the guessing probability of both partial solutions S↓ and S↑ directly depends on the
distance from the diagonal, the new decomposition of Se has a lower guessing probability, which contradicts with the
optimality of the original solution.
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In what follows, we show how to find the solution to the following optimization problem:
max{λ} ∑i γi(λi,N + λi,Y + λi,H ⋅ gi)
s.t. ∑
i
γi (λi,Y + λi,H ⋅ pi) = α
∑
i
γiλi,Y = β
λi,N + λi,Y + λi,H = 1 ∀i
λi,{N,Y,H} ≥ 0.
(B.1)
Recall that we use the following notation: We start by dividing the set of all sources of entropy S into two sets,S+ and S−. The source Si belongs to S+ if and only if pi > 12 , otherwise it belongs to S−. We define N+ as the number
of sources in the set S+ (including the possibility that N+ represents ∞). We use positive integers i ≥ 1 for indexing
the elements of S+, and negative integers i ≤ −1 for indexing the elements of S−. This allows us to define N− = −∣S−∣,
where ∣S−∣ is the cardinality of S− (again, potentially infinite). Then, without loss of generality, we order the sources
in the set S such that ∀i > j ∶ pi ≥ pj . (B.2)
We use a convention that unless specified otherwise, ∑i denotes the sum through all sources from S . Last but not
least, note that we deliberately left out the index i = 0, as it is used later in the proof.
In order to make the appendix self-consistent, also recall that for the measured parameters to be physical, we
require
0 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ p + β(1 − p). (B.3)
Substituting the equality constrains of Eq. (B.1) together with Eq. (B.2), we can further simplify the optimization
problem to
max{λ} 1 − (α − β) + ∑i∈S+ γiλi,H(2pi − 1) (B.4)
s.t. ∑
i
γiλi,H ⋅ pi = α − β (B.5)
∑
i
γiλi,Y = β (B.6)
λi,N + λi,Y + λi,H = 1 ∀i (B.7)
λi,{N,Y,H} ≥ 0. (B.8)
It is now easy to see that in order to find the maximum of (B.4), we need to set as many λi,H = 1 as possible, starting
with ones with the highest parameter pi. Of course this needs to be done with the constraints (B.5) – (B.8) in mind.
Let us start with the simpler of two possibilities, which contains the first two forms of the optimal solution
described in appendix A. If ∑
i∈S+ γipi ≤ α − β, (B.9)
then we can set λi,H = 1 for all i ∈ S+ (and therefore λi,N = λi,Y = 0 for all i ∈ S+). It remains to show that we
can find values for the other λ variables such that the solution fulfills all the constraints. Let us first treat the case of
both sets S− and S+ being non-empty. The other two special cases will be treated separately later. First, let us set for∀i ∈ S−
λi,H = ∆ = α − β −∑i∈S+ γipi∑i∈S− γipi . (B.10)
Let us now show that this is indeed a valid assignment, i.e. 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1. Although the positivity of ∆ follows trivially
from (B.9), the second inequality is a little more involved. In order to show that ∆ ≤ 1, let us note that since (B.3)
holds for each αi, βi and pi (this is a necessary condition for the statistics produced by Si to be physical, see the
middle subfigure of Fig. 7), due to its linearity it also holds for α = ∑i αi, β = ∑i βi and p = ∑i γipi (see the left
subfigure of Fig. 7). Therefore, from (B.3) we get
α − β ≤ p − βp ≤ p = ∑
i∈S− γipi + ∑i∈S+ γipi, (B.11)
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which proves ∆ ≤ 1. Using the values λi,H = 1 for i ∈ S+ and λi,H = ∆ for i ∈ S−, it is straightforward to verify that
the constraint (B.5) is satisfied.
In order to satisfy (B.6) we need to show that
(1 −∆) ∑
i∈S− γi ≥ β. (B.12)
Note that because of (B.7), we have that ∀i ∈ S−, (1 −∆) = λi,Y + λi,N . Therefore,
(1 −∆) ∑
i∈S− γi = ∑i∈S− γi(1 −∆) = ∑i∈S− γi(λi,Y + λi,N). (B.13)
If (1 − ∆)∑i∈S− γi ≥ β, we can clearly find positive values of λi,Y and λi,N , such that ∑i∈S− γiλi,Y = β and∑i∈S− γiλi,N = (1 −∆)∑i∈S− γi − β is positive, thus all the constraints of our optimization problem are satisfied.
The first step to prove (B.12), is to show that
∑
i∈S− γipi ≤ p ∑i∈S− γi. (B.14)
We have that
p =∑
i
γipi = ∑
i∈S− γipi + ∑i∈S+ γipi = p− ∑i∈S− γi + p+ ∑i∈S+ γi, (B.15)
where p− = ∑i∈S− γipi∑i∈S− γi , and p+ = ∑i∈S+ γipi∑i∈S+ γi . Notice that p is a convex combination of p− and p+ with p− ≤ p+, and
therefore p− ≤ p ≤ p+. Then, it also holds that ∑i∈S− γipi = p−∑i∈S− γi ≤ p∑i∈S− γi.
Now using (B.14) and (B.3) again, we get
β ∑
i∈S− γipi ≤ βp ∑i∈S− γi ≤ (p − α + β) ∑i∈S− γi = ⎛⎝∑i∈S− γipi + ∑i∈S+ γipi − α + β⎞⎠ ∑i∈S− γi (B.16)
Since S− is non-empty, we have that ∑i∈S− γipi ≠ 0, which leads to
β ≤ (1 − −∑i∈S+ γipi + α − β∑i∈S− γipi ) ∑i∈S− γi = (1 −∆) ∑i∈S− γi, (B.17)
that is, Eq. (B.12) holds, which proves that it is possible to satisfy all conditions (B.5) to (B.8) while maximizing the
guessing probability by a suitable choice of λ’s. Setting λi,H = 1,∀i ∈ S+ yields
g∗ = 1 − (α − β) + ∑
i∈S+ γi(2pi − 1). (B.18)
Let us now return to the two special cases. First, assume that S+ is empty (this is in fact the first form of the solution
described in appendix A). In such a case (B.15) is not well-defined (because in the definition of p+ we divide by 0).
However, the goal of (B.15) is to prove (B.14), which in this case holds trivially, since p = ∑i∈S− γipi and∑i∈S− γi = 1.
It remains to solve the case of S− being empty. Then from (B.9) we have that p ≤ α − β. Simultaneously, from
(B.11) we have that p ≥ α − β. Therefore, α − β = p, and in order to fulfill (B.5), we require λi,H = 1 for all i. Also,
now we can use the identity α = p + β and (B.3) again to derive p + β ≤ p + β(1 − p), which allows a solution only
for β = 0 (otherwise the observed point (α,β) is non-physical). With β = 0 it is easy to see that other constrains are
satisfied as well and the maximum is equal to p. Note that this is in some sense an extreme case, since the observed
point such as this can be obtained only with perfectly error-less devices in the limit of the infinite number of rounds
(otherwise the sampling error bars would move the observed point away from the perfect case – see appendix E).
Now we deal with the more interesting case of
∑
i∈S+ γipi > α − β, (B.19)
which represents the last possible form of the solution described in appendix A. In this case we cannot set λi,H = 1
for ∀i ∈ S+, as this would violate condition (B.5). If we are only concerned with the variables λi,H , it is clear that in
the optimal case we could set
λi,H = 0 ∀i ∈ S−, (B.20)
19
as sources in S− does not contribute to the objective function in Eq. (B.4). Using this we can rewrite (B.4) into
max{λ} 1 + (α − β) −∑i γiλi,H (B.21)
Next – still only being concerned with λi,H – we argue that (B.21) is maximized by choosing λi,H = 1 for the largest
pi (large i) and zero elsewhere, except for a single element with 0 < λi,H < 1 (see the rightmost subfigure of Fig. 7).
This can be seen from the fact that keeping the sum of∑i γiλi,H ⋅pi constant while minimizing∑i γiλi,H (as it enters
the maximization function with a negative sign) is the same as maximizing ∑i γiλi,H ⋅ pi while keeping ∑i γiλi,H
constant, which is clearly achieved by choosing γiλi,H large for pi large and vice versa. In the following, we show
that it is indeed possible to choose the values of λi,H according to this procedure, and satisfy all the constraints
Eqs. (B.5) – (B.8), by providing an explicit assignment of all the λ variables in Eqs. (B.27) – (B.29).
To obtain the explicit assignment, let us first define the natural number N in the following implicit way
N+∑
i=N γipi ≥ α − β (B.22)
N+∑
i=N+1γipi < α − β. (B.23)
In case we have that ∑N+i=N γipi > α − β, we perform the following trick: we formally divide the box labeled N into
two boxes, labeled N − 1 and N , both having the same pN . The new parameters γ̃N and γ̃N−1 will be defined in the
following way
γ̃N = α − β −∑N+i=N+1 γipi
pN
(B.24)
γ̃N−1 = γN − γ̃N . (B.25)
Note that both values are well defined, because γN ∈ S+, and thus pN > 12 . All the boxes labeled by i < N are
re-labeled i→ i− 1, utilizing the so-far unused index i = 0. This new set of boxes will have the same properties as the
old one, it is a mere change of mathematical description. For this new set it holds that
N+∑
i=N γ̃ipi = α − β. (B.26)
Now we are ready to state the values of the parameters λ that maximize g∗ in the following way
λi,H = 1 ∀i ≥ N (B.27)
λi,H = 0 ∀i < N (B.28)
λi,Y = ω ∀i < N, (B.29)
(B.30)
with all other parameters given by the condition for their sum. In the above formulas, we use the definition
ω = β∑N−1i=N− γ̃i . (B.31)
Note that this is well-defined, as ∑N−1i=N− γ̃i = 0 would imply that S− is empty, as well as N = 1 and γ̃0 = 0 (i.e. the
first non-zero γi is γN , but we can always start the indexing from the first non-zero element, that is, γN = γ1). This in
turn implies that γ1 = γ̃1 and (B.26) becomes ∑i∈S+ γipi = α − β, which contradicts Eq. (B.19). Now the maximum
guessing probability is
g∗ = 1 + (α − β) − N+∑
i=N γ̃i. (B.32)
The only thing that needs to be shown is that ω ≤ 1, as its positivity is obvious from its definition (B.31). This comes
from the facts that N ≥ 1, p∑N+i=N γ̃i ≤ ∑N+i=N γ̃ipi (the argument is analogous to (B.14)) in combination with (B.3):
p − p N−1∑
i=N− γ̃i = p
N+∑
i=N γ̃i ≤
N+∑
i=N γ̃ipi = α − β ≤ p − βp, (B.33)
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from which we have that
β ≤ N−1∑
i=N− γ̃i, (B.34)
and therefore ω ≤ 1.
It remains to join (B.18) and (B.32) into a single formula. It suffices to plug (B.24) into (B.32) and obtain:
g∗ = 1 − (α − β) (1 − pN
pN
) + N+∑
i=N+1γi ( pipN − 1) . (B.35)
Note that if ∑i∈S+ γipi > α − β, one needs to calculate N from (B.22) and (B.23). In case ∑i∈S+ γipi ≤ α − β, we
simply set N = 0 and pN = 12 and obtain the solution (B.18).
Last but not least, using the modified parameters γ̃i, the solution can take the following simple form obtained by
plugging (B.26) into (B.32):
1 − (α − β) + N+∑
i=N γ̃i(2pi − 1), (B.36)
with N explicitly defined by (B.26). This form is particularly useful in the derivation of the case with mixed sources
with partially characterized γ (see Section 3.3), where we can show that in the optimal solution (B.22) holds with
equality and therefore ∀i, γ̃i = γi.
C Mean photon number analysis
In section 3 we have shown that the optimization problem associated with the scenario with partial information about
the mixed entropy source can be stated as
max{γ} 1 − (α − β) + N+∑i=N γi(2pi − 1),
s.t. fj(γ) = cj ∀j∑
i
γi = 1
γi ≥ 0
N+∑
i=N γipi = (α − β).
(C.1)
We have also argued that the solution to this problem can be obtained by finding the maximum for each fixed value
of N in the range {1, . . . ,N+}, and the overall solution is the largest of these maxima. In order to proceed with the
analytical solution of this problem, let us restrict to a single linear constraint function, cγ = ∑i aiγi, and reformulate
the optimization problem using the Lagrange function for each fixed N ,
LN = 1 − (α − β) + N+∑
i=N γi(2pi − 1) − τnorm (∑i γi − 1) − τf (∑i aiγi − cγ) − τN (
N+∑
i=N γipi − (α − β)) , (C.2)
with the half-plane conditions γi ≥ 0 for all i.
In order to find the maximum, we need to examine partial differentiation of (C.2) over all variables γi, τf , τN , τnorm.
While the partial derivatives over τf , τN , τnorm are the required equality constraints of (C.1) for γ, f andN , the partial
derivatives over all γi have the following form:
∂γiLN = −τnorm − τfai if i < N (C.3)
∂γiLN = (2pi − 1) − τnorm − τfai − τNpi if i ≥ N. (C.4)
Now we need to examine all the stationary points of (C.2). We will argue that on the stationary points, for each
variable γi, the corresponding partial derivative is either equal to 0, or γi = 0 (so that the variable γi is actually on
the boundary of its allowed interval). We first divide the {γi} into two sets: Γ0 = {γi∣∂γiLN = 0} (note that this set
cannot contain all the variables, because it is impossible to find values of τ{norm,f,N} for which all partial derivatives
(C.3) and (C.4) vanish), and Γb = {γi} ∖ Γ0. Since by construction the variables in Γb have non-zero derivatives, by
the extreme value theorem the maximum of (C.2) must be attained when these variables are on their boundary. This
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is when γi = 0, since all other constraints are taken care of with the derivatives ∂{τf ,τN ,τnorm}LN = 0. A maximum
may therefore be found if for all γi ∈ Γb we have ∂γiLN < 0 (i.e. the value of L is increasing towards the boundary of
all γi ∈ Γb), and since LN is linear in all γi this maximum would be a global one. The remaining issue is therefore to
find the optimal set Γ0 for which the derivatives (C.3) and (C.4) vanish. We proceed to construct this optimal set by
showing how alternative choices cannot be the optimal solution.
Further analysis now depends on the exact values of ai and pi. In section 5 we have shown that in our experiment,
if we characterize the photon source with the mean number of photons only, the constraint function is µ = ∑i iγi.
Therefore, we will focus on the case where {ai} is a non-negative, unbounded, and strictly increasing sequence, with
our prime example being {ai = i}. Likewise {pi = 1−pii} in our experimental section, so we require {pi} to be a non-
negative strictly increasing sequence such that {pi/ai} is strictly decreasing. Since the sequence {ai} is unbounded,
we need to have τf ≥ 0, otherwise both (C.3) and (C.4) will become positive for some (large enough) value of i. One
(trivial) solution is choosing τf = 0, which is only possible for τnorm ≥ 0 by (C.3). This would allow to have all γi for
i < N potentially non-zero. But then (C.4) will become
∂γiLN = (2 − τN)pi − 1 − τnorm. (C.5)
If τN ≥ 2, then this equation is always negative, leading to γi = 0 for i ≥ N , which would violate the last constraint
(C.1). For smaller τN , assume ∂γiLN = 0 for some i. Then, since the {pi} are increasing, ∂γi+1LN > 0. As we
have argued above, that would not lead to a maximum, since γi ≥ 0, and the derivatives of the Γb variables should be
negative. Therefore we conclude that τf > 0.
For i < N , Eq. (C.3) now reads τnorm = −τfai. Since all of the {ai} are different, this equation can only
be satisfied for a single variable γi. Notice however that (C.3) is a decreasing function in i, therefore in order to
guarantee that all the non-zero partial derivatives ∂γiLN are negative, we must have τnorm = −a0τf . That is, γ0 ∈ Γ0
and γ0<i<N ∈ Γb, i.e. γi = 0 for 0 < i < N . Eq. (C.4) now reads:
i ≥ N ∶ ∂γiLN = (2 − τN)pi − (ai − a0)τf − 1. (C.6)
Since we have two free parameters available (τf and τN ), it is possible to achieve ∂γiLN = 0 for at most two different
values of i. Notice that (ai − a0) > 0, and we have shown that τf > 0. Therefore (2 − τN) must be positive, or else
all ∂γi≥NLN < 0. Furthermore, since {pi/ai} is strictly decreasing, then (C.6) is also strictly decreasing. Therefore,
in order to satisfy (C.4) for two different γi and to have all the rest of the partial derivatives negative, it must hold that
∂γi=NLN = 0 and ∂γi=NLN+1 = 0. The conditions cannot be solved for the rest, so γi>N+1 = 0.
Now, we know that Γ0 = {γ0, γN , γN+1} are the only non-zero variables. We can therefore use the original
problem constraints to solve for the unknowns. Namely:
1 = γ0 + γN + γN+1 (C.7)
cγ = a0γ0 + aNγN + aN+1γN+1 (C.8)
α − β = pNγN + pN+1γN+1 (C.9)
This linear system of equations is then solved. The only difficulty remaining is that, depending on the values of {ai}
and {pi}, it is not at all clear that the solutions satisfy γi ≥ 0 for a given N . In fact, we will show that in our prime
example, {ai = i}, cγ = µ, and {pi = 1−pii}, only a finite number of N can satisfy the positivity constraints for γ. We
therefore switch to this concrete example to finish this section. The solution to the linear system of equations reads:
γ0 = 1 − γN − γN+1 (C.10)
γN+1 = µ −NγN
N + 1 (C.11)
γN = (N + 1)(α − β) − µ(1 − piN+1)(N + 1)(1 − piN) −N(1 − piN+1) . (C.12)
Note that γN is approaching infinity with increasing N . This means that only a finite number of values N need to be
tested, as for sufficiently large N we have γN > 1 and the positivity constraints for γN+1 and γ0 cannot be satisfied.
Therefore, the final guessing probability will be the maximum from the finite number of guessing probabilities of
the form:
g∗N = 1 + (α − β) − (α − β) + µ(piN+1 − piN)(N + 1)(1 − piN) −N(1 − piN+1) (C.13)
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D Multiphoton events
In this appendix we show that n photon events in the setting described in section 4 can be interpreted as simple
sources with p = 1 − pin. Recall that in case the photon source emits n photons, the number of transmitted photons
can vary between 0 and n. The response function of a measurement device needs to assign a click/no-click event to
each received photon number. This can be done in 2n+1 different ways.
Let us start by characterizing all the possible 2n+1 response functions. Each response function can be characterized
by specifying for which number of transmitted photons the measurement device clicks, i.e. by a subsetC ⊆ {0, . . . , n}.
If we denote by T the classical event of counting the transmitted photons, we have that
P (T = i) = (n
i
)(1 − pi)ipin−i. (D.1)
Now the response function indexed by C can be characterized by the vector
SC = (P (click∣x = 0), P (click∣x = 1)) = (pC , c), (D.2)
where pC = ∑i∈C P (T = i) and
c = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if 0 ∈ C0 if 0 ∉ C. (D.3)
For each of these response functions, the adversary tries to guess whether the measurement device clicks or does not
click in a given round. The guessing probability corresponding to the response function C is
gC = max(pC ,1 − pC). (D.4)
In what follows, we show that every strategy can be written as a convex combination of the four response functions
corresponding to C = ∅ (“Never Click”), C = {0, . . . , n}, (“Always Click”), C = {1, . . . , n} (“Honest Strategy”) and
C = {0} (“Opposite of Honest Strategy”). Their corresponding SC vectors are:
SN = (0,0) (D.5)
SY = (1,1)
SH = (1 − pin,0)
S¬H = (pin,1).
Clearly, each response function with 0 ∉ C has pC ≤ 1−pin and therefore it can be expressed as a convex combination
of SN and SH . Similarly, each response function with 0 ∈ C has pC ≥ pin and thus can be expressed as a convex
combination of SY and S¬H .
In order to finish the argument, it remains to show that simulating each SC with the above-mentioned strategies
actually increases the adversary’s guessing probability. Without loss of generality let us examine response functions
with 0 ∉ C. The argument for response functions with 0 ∈ C is analogous. As argued before, any such strategy can be
written as
SC = λSH + (1 − λ)SN , (D.6)
where λ = pC1−pin . Recall that the guessing probability corresponding to SC is gC = max(pC ,1 − pC). On the other
hand, if SC is expressed as a convex combination of SH and SN , we have
g′C = λ [max(pin,1 − pin)] + (1 − λ). (D.7)
For any strategy such that 0 ∉ C we have 0 ≤ pC ≤ 1 − pin and thus pin ≤ 1 − pC ≤ 1. If 1 − pin ≤ pin, it also holds
that pC ≤ 1 − pC and
g′C = λ [max(pin,1 − pin)] + (1 − λ), (D.8)= λpin + (1 − λ),= 1 − λ(1 − pin),= 1 − pC= gC . (D.9)
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In case 1 − pin ≥ pin we have
g′C = λ [max(pin,1 − pin)] + (1 − λ), (D.10)= λ(1 − pin) + (1 − λ),= 1 − λpin≥ gC ,
where the last inequality holds because 1−λpin is larger or equal to both 1− pC = 1−λ(1− pin) and pC = λ(1− pin).
This proves that expressing any strategy of the form SC as a convex combination of SH and SN is not only possible,
but advantageous for the adversary. Therefore, the optimal adversary strategy in each n photon event involves only
response functions that decide on whether the measurement device received a signal (a positive number of photons) or
not. Thus each n photon event can be described by a simple source Si, which sends a signal with probability 1 − pin.
E Sampling error
In this section we address the inevitable uncertainty associated with estimating parameters of probability distributions.
Both α = P (click∣x = 0) and β = P (click∣x = 1) describe the parameters of Bernoulli random variables. Therefore,
the most conservative approach is to use one-sided (1 − ) confidence intervals to bound these parameters. Over-
estimating β or under-estimating α would lead to overestimating the entropy of the data.
To see how this is done, first let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be a sequence of n observed i.i.d. trials, with Xi ∼ Bernoulli(θ),
and X¯ = 1n ∑ni=1Xi. The desired error can be obtained by using the Chernoff–Hoeffding inequality [33].
P (X¯ −E[X¯] ≥ t) ≤ e−2nt2 (E.1)
P (−X¯ +E[X¯] ≥ t) ≤ e−2nt2 . (E.2)
Note that since E[X¯] = θ, these inequalities bound the probability that the estimated (observed) probability of
success (X¯) is larger (E.1) or smaller (E.2) than the true value θ by more than t. By setting  = e−2nt2 and solving for
t, we obtain t = √ln (1 )/2n. Equipped with this, we construct bounded estimators αˆ, βˆ, such that:
P (α ∈ (αˆ,1] & β ∈ [0, βˆ)) ≥ (1 − )2 ≈ 1 − 2. (E.3)
Since the choice of shutter settings are independent, and the trials themselves are i.i.d., the confidence of both esti-
mators being in their respective intervals is the product of the individual events. During the experiment we observe
tα (tβ) clicks in nα (nβ) test rounds, from which we construct the estimators
αˆ = tα
nα
−√ln(1

)/2nα (E.4)
βˆ = tβ
nβ
+√ln(1

)/2nβ. (E.5)
The number of test rounds nα and nβ can be optimized as to increase the output entropy per batch of size N , by
solving the following problem:
max
nα,nβ
[H∗min(αˆ, βˆ)(N − nα − nβ)] . (E.6)
Where H∗min is the calculated min-entropy per bit, depending on the assumed scenario. In practice, however, such
an optimization requires the knowledge of the ratios tα/nα and tβ/nβ , which are precisely the values that are being
estimated. To break this cycle, this optimization can be done iteratively in practice, setting some original guesses
(say n = nα,0 = nβ,0) and on each subsequent batch of size N assume that the clicking probabilities are the same as
the previous round, which allows to solve equation (E.6). It is important to highlight, however, that this optimization
process is only for increasing the amount of extractable entropy, and the security of the protocol is not dependent on
finding an optimal solution. Indeed, in our proof of principle experiment we only solved (E.6) approximately.
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